No Woman’s Land: Deterritorialization in Jane Eyre by Ann Marie Martinez

In their many writings, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have put forth the concept of deterritorialization, and it seems that the best way to grasp its meaning is to fall back on one of their own sentences – one both simple and complex at the same time: “A stick is, in turn, a deterritorialized branch.”1 It is something out of its original element. Just like that stick, Jane Eyre is out of her element; but unlike the stick, whose deterritorialization is absolute, Jane is constantly endeavoring to regain her territory. From the moment we first encounter her, she is a voice coming to us from an unknown setting – she is about to tell us of all the places she has been to, but we do not know from where she is speaking. Her voice is in a temporal de- territorialization. As we embark on the journey through her life, we realize that her story is one of advancing toward a completion, both in the self and in the setting.

Jane Eyre does not belong anywhere or to anyone. Her parents and her home, by misfortune, were taken from her, and she has been left without anything to call her own – without a territory. According to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s con- cept of territory, in the ethological sense [it] is understood as the environment of a group [...] that cannot itself be objectively located, but is constituted by the pat- terns of interaction through which the group or pack secures a certain stability and location. Just in the same way the environment of a single person [...] can be seen as a “territory,” in the psychological sense, from which the person acts or returns to.2

Jane may be in the care of Mrs. Reed, she may be in the company of her young cousins, she may sleep near the servants’ quarters, and she may live at Gateshead Hall, but she is shunned by Mrs. Reed, mistreated by her cousins, looked down upon by the servants, and constantly in search of a corner in the great house to call her own. Mrs. Reed considers Jane to lack a “sociable and child-like disposition” 3—she does not even see her as a child; the Reed children call her a “bad animal” and John Reed says to Jane, “you ought to beg, and not live here with gentlemen’s children like us” 4; the servants see Jane as “someone less than a servant, for [she] does nothing for [her] keep.” 5 Many times she is left by herself because she has not integrated into any of the household’s groups. And, as “Jane looks wistfully toward the light and warmth of the servant community [ at one point, she] has no more place there than she does among the Reeds,”6 and so must continue by herself. Possibly, if Jane saw the environment around her as a home-environment, she would respond to it warmly, but, most importantly, since Jane sees herself as an outsider everything and everyone is as foreign to her as she is to them. She says,

I was a discord in Gateshead Hall: I was like nobody there: I had nothing in har- mony with Mrs. Reed or her children, or her chosen vassalage. If they did not love me, in fact, as little did I love them. [I was] a thing that could not sympathize with one amongst them; a heterogeneous thing, opposed to them in temperament, in capacity, in propensities; [...] a noxious thing [...].7

Jane, however, is free precisely because she is deterritorialized. In fact, “[d]eterritorialisation [sic] frees a possibility or event from its actual origins”8 be- cause without an attachment to something specific mobility is increased. Hence, her transfer to Lowood is not emotionally disturbing because she has no attachment to Gateshead. She is free to explore and roam. Indeed she does, for “everyone, at every age, in the smallest things as in the greatest challenges, seeks a territory, tolerates or carries out deterritorializations, and is reterritorialized on almost any- thing,”9 so Jane seeks the territory she lacks; nevertheless, her deterritorialization continues at Lowood Institution.

Here, too, she sees herself as alien to her sur- roundings – even though her stay extends for eight years in which she is first a stu- dent and then a teacher. Her emotional attachments are limited to two individuals: Miss Temple and Helen Burns. The first agreeable moment Jane enjoys at Lowood is in their company. There is the warmth of the fire in Miss Temple’s room, tea and seed-cake to appease hunger, but, yet again, Jane is the outsider – she is the visitor in someone else’s territory. Jane stands aside and observes Helen and Miss Tem- ple: “They conversed of things I had never heard of [...] they spoke of books: how many they had read! What stores of knowledge they possessed! Then they seemed so familiar with French names and French authors” 10; and as the girls leave the room, Jane notices that “Helen she held a little longer than me: she let her go more reluctantly; it was Helen her eye followed to the door; it was for her she a second time breathed a sigh; for her she wiped a tear from her check.”11 Highlighting the connection between them of which Jane is not a part. During Helen’s sickness, she (Helen) is kept in Miss Temple’s room, and when Jane hears about Helen’s immi- nent death, she literally crawls into Helen’s territory, into the crib, and stays with her until the end later that same night. The following chapter resumes the story eight years later, with Jane assuming the role of teacher as well as Helen’s former position as Miss Temple’s favorite.

And while at first Jane describes Lowood, its surroundings, and its modus operandi in relative detail, she abridges this period with a simple sentence, by saying, “During these eight years my life was uniform: but not unhappy, because it was not inactive.”12 Jane has not found something to call her own at Lowood per se, but she has, though, in Miss Temple. Jane says of her, “to her instruction I owed the best part of my acquirements; her friendship and society had been my continual solace; she had stood me in the stead of mother, governess, and latterly, companion.”13 But upon Miss Temple’s marriage and de- parture from Lowood, Jane finds herself once more facing acute deterritorialized, because the one thing, the one person, she can claim for herself leaves, never to return; as Jane explains, “[f]rom the day she left I was no longer the same: with her was gone every settled feeling, every association that had made Lowood in some degree a home to me.”14 Admitting to herself that she does not belong propels her to continue her search.

Jane casts herself out into the world in order to attain what she lacks, and falls into the role of a governess. However, in nineteenth century England, the one occupa- tion that placed a person at a middle ground, alien to those immediately around her, was that of a governess. Any young woman stepping into this profession at the time “must live daily amidst the trials of a home without its blessings; [...] without any consent of her will, she is made the confidante of many family secrets; [...] she must appear not to hear sharp sayings and mal-a-propos speeches; she must be ever on her guard.”15 A governess is to be a member of the household, but the schism that separates her from those sharing the roof with her runs deep. Because of her higher education and social class, to the “servants she was as unapproachable as any other middle-class lady.”16 And since there was no real difference between the governesses and the families that employed them, a “fictitious barrier” had to be created, for, as was advised in magazines at the time, “[w]e must ever keep them in a sort of isolation, for it is the only means for maintaining that distance which the reserve of English manners and the decorum of English families exact.”17 The gov- erness is the buffer that has access to both groups yet belongs to neither.

At Thornfield, Jane both places herself and is placed by others in this middle bub- ble of the governess. Although conscious of being an employee, she sets herself apart from the other servants in the house, as she says, “[t]he other members of the household, viz. John and his wife, Leah, the housemaid, and Sophie the French nurse, were decent people; but in no respect remarkable,”18 and they, as well, avoid socializing with her beyond the everyday common greetings. Upon first arriving and meeting Mrs. Fairfax, Jane feels welcomed and content to work for such a per- son. “My heart really warmed to the worthy lady as I heard her talk”19; but, upon learning the very next day that Mrs. Fairfax is not the owner of the house, Jane re- sponds in the following manner:

The enigma was then explained: this affable and kind little widow was no great dame, but a dependent like myself. I did not like her the worse for that; on the con- trary, I felt better pleased than ever. The equality between her and me was real; not the mere result of condescension on her part: so much the better – my position was all the freer.

While Jane may consider herself on an equal level with Mrs. Fairfax, and thus not alone, she has clearly brought her down from being a “worthy lady” to a “little widow,” right into Jane’s own middle bubble. Indeed, seemingly there is no “lady of the house,” so Jane may take certain freedoms that would otherwise be unavail- able. And yet, it is with the arrival of Rochester’s guests that Jane experiences the pangs of the social class divide once again. When these guests enter the drawing- room and find Jane sitting by the window, with Adele, responding to Jane’s curt- sey, “one or two bent their heads in return; the others only stared.”21 For them, Jane is someone they cannot socialize with, and subsequently, a potted plant – they discuss any matter before her as if she were not there, even talking of the faults of the governess in her presence. Indeed, “[a]t Gateshead and Thornfield both, she is neither family nor servant, but floating uncomfortably between.”22

Due to her deterritorialization, since childhood, Jane lacks a static role model from whom she can build her own self-image. There is no one to tell her who she is. Consequently, Jane creates herself by taking fragments from the women around her – they define what she is, and what she is not. Walter Benjamin discussed the con- cept of a vessel created by the unification of diverse fragments in order to complete the whole. “Fragments of a vessel,” he says, “which are to be glued together must match one another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one an- other.”23 While Jane is selective, she appropriates fragments from the very diverse women around her, in order to create and complete her own self – the English lady she wishes to become. As a child at Gateshead, Jane lacks role models, let alone positive ones, with the exception of Bessie, who “employs her as ‘a sort of under- nursery maid, to tidy the room, dust the chairs, &c’ [...] apprenticing her in the ways of serving, as a mother would her daughter. This apprenticeship is consistent with Jane’s developing self-perception.”24 Bessie is the only person at Gateshead to offer Jane a kind word. And it is Bessie’s words that Jane carries with her, for her latter belief in the unexplained and otherworldly steams from Bessie’s evening ghost stories, which are strewn throughout the novel giving way to both minor and major events – as is the introduction of Rochester, who “first appears in a super- natural haze, as if he had come galloping out of one of Bessie’s nightmarish tales,”25 and Jane’s eventual return to Rochester by heeding the voice she hears in the night wind.

Jane’s further socialization is taken from those she admires most at Lowood. Even though at Gateshead Jane was treated as a beggarly dependent, she has always seen herself as belonging to a higher social class. The first person she sees as a lady-like role model is Miss Temple, who impresses Jane by her “voice, look, and air.”26 It seems that, Jane’s “organ of Veneration” swells at the very well-dressed sight of [Miss Temple]: not the pharisaic finery of the ladies Brocklehurst, but just enough quiet ele- gance to indicate that here stands a proper specimen of the bourgeois female [...]. As her name suggests, Miss Temple is a living shrine to this type, and Jane quickly comes to worship there.

From her, Jane adapts what she calls her “Lowood notions of the toilette,”28 always wearing a simple dress, smoothed back hair, and, when the occasion calls for, “a single little pearl ornament which Miss Temple gave [her] as a parting keepsake,”29 or even the “strict self-repression” Jane has been taught by the “marble-like” Miss Temple.30

Of Helen Burns, Jane says, “I suspected she might be right, and I wrong,”31 and so she is diligent to integrate in herself Helen’s disposition toward forgiveness, endur- ance, and composure. Helen even says to Jane, “‘Love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you and despitefully use you.’”32 While a young Jane voices her disapproval at such a suggestion at the moment, she is able to precisely follow the advice in her visit to Gateshead during Mrs. Reed’s illness. Later, as she wanders aimlessly through the streets, “[t]he girl who once declared, ‘I must resist those who punish me unjustly’ [...] now swallows her anger at mis- treatment and forgives injustice with Helen’s own complacency,”33 and blames not those who refuse to give her any food or aid, but rather turn her away.

From these three women Jane has taken fragments in order to build her own per- sona; but of others she has been much more discriminatory, and has opted to be their mirror image, reflecting, inversely, their traits. Of Georgiana Reed she has rejected frivolity; of Eliza Reed it is over-zealousness; of Blanche Ingram it is un- truthfulness and charade; of Grace Pole it is vice; of Céline Varéns it is the role of mistress; and of Bertha Mason it is that of subjugation and fury.

Slowly, through her encounters with different women, Jane has almost completed her self, the vessel of her being is almost as intact as it can possibly be, but as her wedding day approaches, Jane senses that a large fragment is yet missing. When, the day after their engagement, Rochester calls her by her future name, that of Jane Rochester, her response is not one of appropriation but of rejection toward it. She says, “I could not quite comprehend it: it made me giddy. The feeling, the an- nouncement sent through me, was something stronger than was consistent with joy – something that smote and stunned: it was, I think, almost fear.”34 A few days later, looking at her packed trunks Jane disowns them as well as the person she is to become:

tomorrow, at this time, [the trunks] would be far on their road to London: and so should I [...] or rather, not I, but one Jane Rochester, a person whom as yet I knew not [...]. I could not persuade myself to affix [the address cards on the trunks], or to have them affixed. Mrs. Rochester! She did not exist.35

On her wedding day, Sophie, the French nurse, calls Jane back to see her reflection in the mirror, and the image that bounces back is not to Jane’s liking. “I saw a robbed and veiled figure” Jane says, “so unlike my usual self that it seemed almost the image of a stranger.”36 The woman she sees in the mirror, the one she is about to become, will be more incomplete than she is because Jane will cease being her own person and become someone else’s “perfect angel” – someone who is com- plete only in another’s eyes, yet incomplete in her own. She cannot proceed to step into the already-completed life of a woman (with a husband, a house, servants, and even a “daughter”) if she has not finished piecing her original self together. That is why, when faced with an uncertain future, Jane decides to leave Thornfield in order to flee from Rochester’s advances and toward her missing fragment.

From infancy, one word has been burned into Jane’s psyche – dependent. Upon her marriage to Rochester her state would not have altered since she would have simply transferred her dependency from being his employee to being his poor, unconnected wife. What Jane precisely lacks is her independence, and the one thing that guaran- tees her such a state is income. The coincidence that of all the homes in England, Jane arrives at the threshold of St. John, Diana, and Mary Rivers’ may seem some- what incredible, but it serves a pivotal purpose for it is there, and only there, where Jane can find her missing fragment. At their home, she not only finds the family she belongs to, but the inheritance she is rightfully to attain. However, she does not remain with them at Moor House because it is not her home, her territory – it is theirs. She would once again be “the other,” the addition. Thus, as an heiress, she now has the financial and social independence she once lacked, and can return on an equal sense, in every way, to Thornfield.

Up to this point, Jane has always been moving away from some place, and this is the first time she is coming back to a place with the idea of remaining there indefi- nitely. Indeed, she is returning, she is reterritorializing herself to Thornfield, the only true home she has known. Had she married Rochester the first time, she would have remained deterritorialized for two reasons. First of all, since “deterrito- rialization, which relies on an initial territorialisation, is also accompanied by reter- ritorialisation [sic]”37 she has to find a territory, leave, and return to it for her to be reterritorialized – remaining there would keep her in a constant state of deterritori- alization. When she approaches Thornfield upon her return, she is exuberant at the prospect of returning because now she identifies it as a home, having been away from it for a period of time; she says, “How fast I walked! How I ran sometimes! How I looked forward to catch the first view of the well-known woods! With what feelings I welcomed single trees I knew, and familiar glimpses of meadow and hill between them!”38 However, when she reaches Thornfield she finds it destroyed. It has burned to the ground at the hands of Bertha Mason. And this, in part, leads to Jane’s true reterritorialization. She could never be “the lady of the house” at Thornfield, for it has always been Bertha’s home – she not only inhabited the attic, but every corner of the house was stamped with her presence. Jane then simply transfers her attachment from Thornfield to Ferndean, thirty miles off, and establishes her home there with its inhabitants, while still remaining in the shadow of Thornfield.

Even though Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre may be simplistically summarized by some as a Cinderella story, in the end, it seems that in fact “Jane does not want a man, she wants a manor.”39 While this too may seem at first like a harsh judgment due to the monetary connotations evoked, Jane does not want the status of a landed gentry, she wants something to call her own.

Cyberethics: Back to the Future by Dr. Jane Robinett, San Diego State University

Computers have reshaped our world and our lives in ways we have not anticipated. They have redefined not only the way in which work is done in offices, schools and manufacturing complexes, but also the nature of work itself. They have shown us that political boundaries are indefensible against invasions of ideas. The steady transborder flow of information and images that computer-based telecommunications networks provide, can threaten and alter even the most entrenched political structures. Computer-based medical technologies have redefined the boundaries of life and death. We have been forced to examine our facile assumptions about life as the ultimate good and death as the ultimate ill which can befall us. This has led to the creation of a new domain for ethicists: bioethics. Bioethics, for all its complexities, has a fundamentally familiar feel to it because it deals primarily with physical or instrumental reality. But computers have created another kind of reality one which Umberto Ecco (Travels in Hyperreality) and Jean Baudrillard, among others, have termed hyperreality. Ecco, who published Travels in Hyperreality in 1975, defines it as a reality that combines the real and the artificial. This combination results in more, a world, that is denser, more packed and vivid than reality itself. Chief among his examples is Disneyland, a world built around the latest technologies and using audioanamatronics, a combination of animation, audio, video, holographics, computers, robotics and lasers.

Baudrillard points to hyperreality as simulation which absorbs reality, a sel-referential object, a hyperreal object without a subject.(1) But for the purposes of our discussion, Albert Borgman’s definition of hyperreality are most helpful. Hyperreality is made possible by information processing “to the extent that it overcomes and displaces tangible reality.” (2) Borgman divides hyperreality into two categories: instrumental hyperreality, like the hyperreality of the financial world, an imaginary world constructed by telecommunications technology (phones, fax machines, modems and computers large and small), and final hyperreality, a not-yet fully realized hyperreal world which involves all our senses and creates a simulated world in which we can live. Although it is an artificial reality, hyperreality can and does replace physical reality because of three characteristics: it is “brilliant”, that is, it includes all physical senses and excludes unwanted information or noise (the sense of machinery operating somewhere in the background), it is rich (dense, allowing for all possibilities), and it is pliable, that is, it can be manipulated in any way we want. It is also attractive because it frees us from the unpredictability and intractability of physical reality and human beings. Hyperreality extends beyond novelty into a kind of parallel world made possible by computers, an electronic reality. It is this new kind of reality which behooves us to re-formulate both traditional ethical theory and traditional definitions of reality. We might call this re-formulation “cyberethics.”

The word “cyber” comes from the Greek [kybernetes] for helmsman, the person who controlled and directed the course of the ship. It was Norbert Wiener who first coined the word “cybernetics.” From this word comes “cyborg,” an acronym for “cybernetic organism,” those artificially created human-like beings which populate our science fiction and foreshadow other kinds of life. In 1985, the fiction of William Gibson first posited a new form of “cyber”: cyberspace, a form of electronic reality generated by the minds of those who use it in what he calls a “consensual hallucination.” Although Gibson’s cyberspace is, at this point, non-existent, instrumental forms of electronic or electro-mechanical hyperreality already exist, and forms of final hyperreality, including Virtual Reality, are now being pioneered by Jaron Lanier and others. What we need to navigate these uncharted waters of this new reality is a new understanding of ethics to steer by.

Ethics deals with the problem of determining what constitutes the correct behavior toward other human beings. It is based on values, some of which are fundamental to all cultures [the value of life and the acceptance of death, honest/truth-telling, fairness/rightness] and others which are culturally determined. Ethics is something which we all take part in. In dealing with people, we always have to choose between alternate courses of action. We base these choices, implicitly or explicitly, on values. In the light of such values, we develop more detailed concepts of what constitutes right and proper conduct toward others. Of course, this does not mean that we all have exactly the same ideas about what right and proper conduct is, nor does it mean that we work from the basis of a formal ethical system. But, in trying to live responsibly, we cannot escape attempting to articulate and apply our values — that is, we cannot escape being ethical.

Typically, in a traditionally-defined community, ethical principles underlie our public and private behavior toward each other, and in general, we act in accordance with these principles. We respect the lives of others, their privacy and property, and their right to self-determination. We observe rules of public order and courtesy based on these principles. We learn forms of ethical behavior from the time we are young. We are taught both overtly and by the constant examples we see around us, by what we read, hear and watch. This ethical behavior is reflected in the order of the communities we live in. Of course, there are always people who actively disregard ethical behavior. The results of this appear daily in the headlines, but it is news because it deviates so sharply from the norm. The surprising thing is not that people commit murder and mayhem, but that so many of us arrive home in the evening without having done grievous bodily harm to at least one of the people we have encountered during the course of the day.

Because we have so much practice, it is usually easy for us to determine what the correct action is when we are dealing with another person, even if we don’t do it. But it becomes increasingly difficult for us to behave ethically when the other person is not physically present, or when we have no sense of another physical person, when such a person is only present representationally in a data construct or a holographic representation. When we enter the hyperreal worlds which computers make possible, it becomes difficult to see that ethical behavior is even called since no physical or material forms of life are present.

By contrast to traditional notions of ethics, cyberethics should designate the correct form of behavior toward human beings, as the boundaries of their lives are redefined for us by information technology. Each of us, although we are rarely aware of it, exists not only as a physical person, but also as a collection of information located in various data bases. That informational representation of our selves does much to determine our lives. Because we now have this kind of dual existence, ethics must deal not only with actual physical people in a material reality, but also with their extended representations — that is, with the models or constructs of those lives which computers create and make widely available (the virtual person as opposed to the physical person). Cyberethics should also extend the boundaries of ethical behavior to encompass other kinds of lives and resources as they are included in an augmented understanding of what is essential to life, both human and non-human life.

Perhaps the clearest illustration of why and where cyberethics are needed, lies in computer networks. In order to begin, we need to understand how networks are constituted, not in terms of hardware and software, but in terms of the people who are linked together through them. A system built around networks and used to a greater or lesser degree by several thousand (or several hundred thousand) people is not at all unusual. The people who use any on-line system, regardless of its size, constitute a community, that is, they constitute a group of human beings who live or work in close hyperreal proximity to each other, and who share common resources of computing power, storage space, communication lines, programs, hardware, and processing time to achieve their various purposes. The people in this community take part in the same kinds of activities we find in any human community. They work at particular projects, trade information, gossip, argue, joke, play games, ask for (and get) help, strike up new friendships, get angry and shout (called flaming in English) and even commit acts of abuse and violence. In short, a network community, although its physical structure is entirely distinct from a traditional community, is identical in its fundamental aspects to any neighborhood.

But a network community is, to a large extent, invisible as such. It has no single physical location, no visible boundaries, no city limits. Unlike other human communities, it does not consist of the buildings, streets and parks of a physical town which tell us that we are in a place where other humans live, a place where ethical behavior is called for. It has no material existence, and hence, no material reality. It is a community of the mind. Its territory is all virtual territory, existing electronically within the system. It is not visible unless the user is logged on, and even then, the full scope of it is never visible to a single individual. Each user has only a single window from which to view this vast virtual country. But, no matter how large or complex, this community still consists of human beings, each of whom has an electronic home/office (an account) on the system. All of these users must share network resources to achieve their various purposes, and all of them are entitled to the same respect in terms of privacy, property, and self-determination, among other things, as they are in the physical communities of which they are a part.

Networks transcend our physical, social, cultural and national boundaries. When we use them, as we do more and more frequently, we are no longer citizens only of the physical place and time that we inhabit, but of a much larger human community whose territory is composed of virtual space, that is, not of physical expanses (towns, cities, farms, fields and mountains) but a hyperreality equivalent in important ways to physical/material space. Although it is not space in (physical) fact, it is very much space in effect. In this community, unlike other kinds of human communities which are constituted around the physical presence of their members, cannot teach or enforce a code of ethics by example. We have always depended heavily on the presence of others to remind us that we need to behave ethically. In a community of the mind where the nature of reality is significantly altered, it is difficult for people to understand that ethical behavior is required or to learn what constitutes ethical behavior because they feel themselves to be alone. But logging onto a multi-user system means walking into a community of other people. Learning what constitutes right and proper behavior in that hyperreal community is difficult unless these ideas are deliberately articulated, disseminated, and discussed. Many universities and research facilities that use networks have, in recent years, drawn up codes of ethics for members of this community, but many users never bother to read them.

Network communities are not the only example of the new kind of reality with which cyberethics must deal. Data models (information constructs) of the person also exist in this hyperreality. Those information constructs are routinely bought and sold in great volume. Many people regard these kinds of files as ethically inert. When the person is represented only by a few lines in a database or by a series of linked files, it might seem that there is no need to even consider ethical behavior. Should those files be erased, edited, altered, copied or damaged, there is no sense of causing harm, because there is no sense of damage to either physical persons or material property. The hyperreality in which those files exist appears to be clearly separate from physical reality. However, any alteration to that hyperreal model of the individual can have very damaging effects in the physical reality which the person inhabits, effects no less damaging and far more enduring, than a punch in the eye. Although computer files exist in hyper, not physical, reality, they affect and intrude on material reality.

The whole concept of virtual entities (virtual memory, virtual machines, virtual space, virtual communities, virtual persons, virtual reality) constitutes a good example of a new concept that computers have made possible for us. These forms of hyperreality are both real in effect and intangible in fact — virtual memory behaves like memory in your computer, but it is a space created or designated by the computer and not an physical array of memory chips. Among them is the most completely realized form of hyperreality that currently exists: virtual reality. Virtual reality is an entirely computer-generated physical environment which we enter via a virtual reality helmet and goggles and a set of gloves. Within this hyperreal world, we can move around, open doors, walk through rooms, poke around in cupboards, maneuver objects, play handball, perform surgery, or manipulate genes, just as if we were operating in a physical reality. It is an entirely new kind of reality, no less real than physical reality in effect but different in nature than physical reality. Just as it took entirely new tools to create, it will need entirely new definitions of reality before we can begin to think about how human beings should behave in such an environment.

The idea of a reality with no tangible physical existence is entirely new territory for us. Traditional theories of reality (ontologies), as Albert Borgman points out are “powerless to explicate the difference between the real and hyperreal….” (Crossing the Post Modern Divide, 95) In the same way, present perceptions of ethics do not encompass human behavior in this kind of reality. Traditional ethics defines our areas of ethical responsibility too narrowly to be helpful in dealing with the kind of reality which these systems present us with.

The hyperreality which virtual reality systems combined with holographics and audioanimtronics make possible, although it may appear identical to physical reality, is nevertheless disconnected from it. When we enter hyperreality we are cut off from physical contexts, even when the illusion of the physical is perfect. Hyperrealities are disposable; we can dispense with them when we wish, an impossibility with physical realities. When we leave, we find ourselves within the context of the physical world.

The job of cyberethics, then, is threefold: first, it must redefine the concept of reality to include the present and future hyperrealities which electronic, holographic and audioanimatronic systems create. Second, it must redefine ethics to include what lies beyond old bounds of the physical person and the physical community. We can no longer afford an concept of ethics which applies only to our behavior toward the physical person. The same respect and care accorded to the physical person of human beings must be extended to include the information constructs that, in one way or another, define and support their lives and well-being, information that exists in another kind of reality. Cyberethics must begin to map out guidelines for both the ethical uses of and ethical conduct in hyperrealities. It should help us consider not only our behavior to the members of the generations of which we are a part, but of those yet to come who will be faced with hyperrealities far more extensive and powerful than those we now have. Finally, it must, like the far older ethical understanding of societies we have been pleased to call primitive, look to correct and proper behavior toward other kinds of lives, large and small, human and non-human, physical and virtual, and toward the resources which support and sustain not only human lives, but the life of the planet.

In order to go forward into a future increasingly mediated by technology, particularly computer technology (a world of biochips, complex hyperspace realities, intelligent machines, and augmented humans), cyberethics must also look ahead to delineate the correct and proper behavior toward the machines and systems which will support and sustain both human and non-human lives, and may in turn, come to be a form of life themselves.

1. See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, New York: Semiotext(e), 1983, for a full discussion of his position.

2. Albert Borgman, Crossing the Postmodern Divide, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 82.